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Abstract—Automated code generators are increasingly used
in safety-critical applications, but since they are typically
not qualiﬁed, the generated code must still be fully tested,
reviewed, and certiﬁed. For mathematical and engineering
software this requires reviewers to trace subtle details of
textbook formulas and algorithms to the code, and to match
requirements (e.g., physical units or coordinate frames) not
represented explicitly in models or code. We support these
tasks by using the AutoCert veriﬁcation system to identify and
verify mathematical concepts in the code, recovering veriﬁed
traceability links between concepts, code, and veriﬁcation
conditions. We then exploit these links to construct a natural
language report that provides a high-level structured argument
explaining where the code uses speciﬁed assumptions and why
and how it complies with the requirements. We have applied
our approach to generate review documents for several sub-
systems of NASA’s Project Constellation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Model-based development and automated code generation
are increasingly used for actual production code, in particu-
lar in mathematical and engineering domains. For example,
NASA’s Project Constellation uses Real-Time Workshop for
its Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GN&C) systems.
However, since code generators are typically not qualiﬁed
[10], there is no guarantee that their output is correct, and
the generated code must thus still be fully tested, reviewed
and certiﬁed. This requires reviewers to match subtle details
of textbook formulas and algorithms to the code, which is
often difﬁcult to understand. Moreover, common modeling
languages do not allow important domain requirements to
be represented explicitly (e.g., coordinate frames); conse-
quently, the generated code is not traced back to them.
The central problem is to disentangle the complexity of
the generated code, in order to build up a comprehensible
explanation in terms of high-level domain concepts. This in
turn requires comprehensive traceability links that associate
the code not only with the model and veriﬁcation artifacts,
but also with abstract concepts and requirements such as
coordinate frames. The challenge is to recover these trace-
ability links: we cannot assume that the code generator will
provide them nor can we rely on the correctness of any links
that are provided. In fact, we need explicit assurance that
the traceability links are correct, because any documentation
Figure 1. Tracing between artifacts
derived from them could be misleading otherwise.
Here we describe a veriﬁcation-driven approach to trace-
ability and documentation. Its central insight is that we
can combine methods from program understanding and pro-
gram veriﬁcation to recover veriﬁed traceability links from
which we can construct natural language documentation
that explains why and how automatically generated code
complies with speciﬁed requirements. The documentation
lists the external assumptions on the code (e.g., the physical
units and constraints on input signals), the dependencies
between variables, and the algorithms, data structures, and
conventions (e.g., quaternion handedness) used by the gen-
erator to implement the model. It also shows how assump-
tions and requirements are related through the code, in
particular, the complete chain of reasoning which allows
the requirements to be concluded from the assumptions,
which assumptions are used to show a speciﬁc requirement,
and which assumptions remain unused. The documentation
is hyper-linked to both the program and the veriﬁcation
conditions, and so gives traceability between veriﬁcation
artifacts, documentation, and code (see Figure 1).
The approach described here is based on the AUTOCERT
code analysis tool [2], which takes a set of requirements,
and formally veriﬁes that the code satisﬁes them. AUTO-
CERT can verify execution-safety requirements (e.g., arraybounds), as well as domain-speciﬁc requirements such as
frame safety. Our approach is generator-independent, and
we have used it with several different in-house and com-
mercial code generators, including Real-Time Workshop. In
particular, we have applied our tool to several subsystems
of the GN&C software currently under development for the
Constellation program, and used it to generate review reports
for domain-speciﬁc requirements such as the consistent use
of Euler angle sequences and coordinate frames.
II. SOFTWARE CERTIFICATION USING AUTOCERT
AUTOCERT certiﬁes every generated program individu-
ally, rather than the generator itself: given a set of for-
mal assumptions (e.g., constraints on input signals) and
requirements (e.g., constraints on output signals), it formally
veriﬁes that the generated code complies with the speciﬁed
requirements. AUTOCERT follows the Hoare logic approach
to veriﬁcation; hence, it needs annotations, i.e., logical
assertions of program properties, at key locations in the
code. These annotations are constructed automatically by a
post-generation inference phase that exploits the idiomatic
nature of auto-generated code and is driven by a generator-
and domain-speciﬁc set of idioms. The inference algorithm
builds an abstracted control-ﬂow graph (CFG), collapsing
the code idioms into single nodes. It then traverses the
CFG from use nodes (where a requirement must be shown)
backwards to all corresponding deﬁnitions (where the rele-
vant properties are ultimately established) and annotates the
statements along the paths as required [2]. A veriﬁcation
condition generator (VCG) processes the annotated code,
feeding a set of veriﬁcation conditions (VCs) into an auto-
mated theorem prover (ATP); their proofs guarantee that the
code satisﬁes the requirements.
AUTOCERT is implemented as a generator-independent
plug-in: since it only analyzes the code and not the model
or the generation process, the generator is treated as a
black box. The inference is customized via a set of high-
level annotation schemas [4], which use patterns to describe
code idioms and actions to construct the annotations needed
to certify a matching code fragment. The schemas remain
untrusted, since the assurance does not rely on their correct-
ness, but follows from the proofs of the corresponding VCs.
The schemas also contain textual descriptions which can be
parametrized by the variables in the pattern, and slots for
recording other information associated with the code, such
as the mathematical conventions it uses.
An annotation schema compiler [4] takes a set of schemas,
and compiles them down into customized annotation and
documentation templates, and concept relations drawn from
a domain ontology. The annotation templates are then used
to produce the annotated program, while the other elements
are used during the document generation process. Hence,
schemas are central to achieving our goal of a uniﬁed
approach to veriﬁcation, documentation, and tracing.
Figure 2. Levels of domain abstraction
III. VERIFIED TRACEABILITY LINK RECOVERY
Link Categories. Traceability links associate different en-
tities from different development phases with each other. In
model-based development, they are generally equated with
links between the individual elements of the model (e.g.,
Simulink boxes) and their representation in the generated
code. Most commercial code generators add them directly
to the generated code (e.g., as comments or embedded hy-
perlinks), and academic research has worked on maintaining
and recovering these links after model or code changes [1].
However, this view is too restrictive for our purposes.
First, the certiﬁcation process is driven by a set of mission-
speciﬁc requirements, and the documents must be struc-
tured according to these; consequently, the traceability links
must go back to these requirements as well. Second, the
documents need to explain the code in terms of high-
level domain concepts not explicitly represented by model
elements. Figure 2 shows some concepts of the GN&C
domain at different levels of abstraction. At the lowest
level, at which a code review is actually carried out, is
the code itself along with primitive arithmetic operators. At
the next level are mathematical operations, such as matrix
multiplication and transpose, and physical values of a given
unit, corresponding to the low-level datatypes. These, in
turn, are used to represent navigational information in terms
of quaternions, directional cosine matrices (DCMs), Euler
angles, etc., in various coordinate systems. This is the level
at which we explain the veriﬁcation. At the highest level
of abstraction are the GN&C principles, themselves, but
explanation at this level is currently beyond our scope. Third,
the documents also need to explain the internal structure of
the code; in particular, we need to recover links reﬂecting the
chains of implications from the properties of one variable to
the properties of one or more dependent variables in order
to show how a requirement ultimately follows through the
code from the assumptions. We thus distinguish several link
categories, depending on the entities related to each other.Requirement-to-concept links relate the individual require-
ments to the concepts in the upper tiers of the domain
abstractions (see Figure 2). They represent the set of data
structures, conventions, and operations used to implement a
given requirement, which is the most important information
from an understanding point of view. Requirement-to-code
links trace individual requirements back to the lines of code
implementing them. They can be used to show that the im-
plementation does not contain any superﬂuous functionality.
Requirement-to-assumption links make explicit on which
of the speciﬁed assumptions the validity of a requirement
rest. This is the most important information from a certiﬁ-
cation point of view. Similarly, requirement-to-axiom links
relate requirements to the speciﬁc domain theory axioms that
are used by the ATP to prove the associated VCs. Note that
most ATPs treat assumptions and axioms interchangeably,
but because they play different roles in the certiﬁcation,
we need two different link categories: the assumptions are
speciﬁc to the code, and need to be established by other
system components, while the axioms represent the logical
formulation of domain concepts and are “hardened” over
time and are thus more trusted. Requirement-to-VC links
primarily serve book-keeping (rather than understanding)
purposes and show which requirements are “at risk” if VCs
have not been proven yet. They are also used to compute
the links in the two categories above, since the VCs give
access to the proofs.
Code-to-code links reﬂect the internal conceptual structure
of the code, not its syntax: two code locations are linked if
they are directly connected by an edge in the abstracted
CFG built by the annotation inference. Simple code-to-VC
links are provided by most formal veriﬁcation tools but links
based on a categorization of the VCs according to their
purpose (e.g., establishing a deﬁnition or showing the safety
of a use location) allow a more ﬁne-grained linking. These
links can also pinpoint the location of faults, if a VC fails.
Link Recovery via Annotation Inference. The core trace-
ability links required to generate meaningful documentation
are code-to-code and requirement-to-concept links. The for-
mer are recovered by AUTOCERT’s annotation inference,
as side effect of the CFG traversal. Recovery of the latter
is based on the fact that matching a schema against the
code is actually performing program understanding, and that
the schema itself thus already reﬂects all domain concepts
that can be extracted from the matched code fragment—
in effect, the schema already tells us everything we need
to know about the code. Since the match is veriﬁed if
all associated VCs are proven, the requirement-to-concept
traceability links are veriﬁed as well.
Consider for example the DCM-NED-to-Nav schema
shown in Figure 3, which looks for a sequence of assign-
ments with values corresponding to the DCM’s entries. If it
is matched against some code, and all VCs are proven, then
schema(dcm_ned_nav=[’a DCM from NED to Nav’]
, frame
, def(V)
, ((V[0]:=x0) :: (x0 ~= cos(H − A);
(V[1]:=x1) :: (x1 ~= -sin(H − A);
(V[2]:=x2) :: (x2 ~= 0);
(V[3]:=x3) :: (x3 ~= sin(H − A);
(V[4]:=x4) :: (x4 ~= cos(H − A);
(V[5]:=x5) :: (x5 ~= 0);
(V[6]:=x6) :: (x6 ~= 0);
(V[7]:=x7) :: (x7 ~= 0);
(V[8]:=x8) :: (x8 ~= 1)
) ← &(post frame(V, dcm(ned, nav)),
pre ∃ ψ, φ · unit(ψ, heading) ∧ unit(φ, azimuth)
∧ x0=cos(ψ − φ) ∧ x1=-sin(ψ − φ) ∧ x2=0
∧ x3=sin(ψ − φ) ∧ x4=cos(ψ − φ) ∧ x5=0
∧ x6=0 ∧ x7=0 ∧ x8=1),
, [dcmrep=vec(9)]
).
Figure 3. Annotation schema
we know for certain that the code is related to the DCM from
NED to Nav concept and, in particular, represents a DCM as
a 9-vector, as stated by the schema’s concept list. Hence, we
have recovered two veriﬁed code-to-concept links, and since
we know the requirement currently being certiﬁed, also two
requirement-to-concept links.
Link Recovery via Veriﬁcation. The VCG is primarily
responsible for the code-to-VC links. It adds the relevant
source code locations to the generated VCs; however, these
need to be maintained by subsequent processing steps,
e.g., simpliﬁcation. Here, we use our previous work on
semantic labeling [3] to achieve the VC categorization
and ﬁne-grained linking. The requirement-to-assumption and
requirement-to-axiom links are extracted from the proofs of
the VCs. This is in principle a simple task, but it requires the
ATP to provide an explicit proof output. We currently only
analyze proofs in the standard TPTP proof notation [11].
IV. GENERATING REVIEW DOCUMENTS
Document Structure. The generated documents are in-
tended as structured reading guides for the code and the
veriﬁcation artifacts, showing why and how the code com-
plies with the speciﬁed requirements. The introduction con-
tains a natural language representation of the formalized
requirements and certiﬁcation assumptions; see Figure 4
for an example. This allows the reviewers to check that
their formalization has not (inadvertently) introduced any
conceptual mismatches. It also contains the requirement-to-
assumption links recovered by the proof analysis, and calls
out assumptions that are not necessary.
Each requirement section starts with a summary of the
the relevant variables and the high-level conventions and
operations used by the code, and concludes with a series of
subsections that explain why and how each of the variablesFigure 4. List of requirements and assumptions
contributes to the requirement. The subsections can contain
explanations of fragments of code, and can refer to the
explanations for other variables, which are cross-linked.
The document’s overall structure thus reﬂects the way the
annotation inference has analyzed the program, starting with
the variables occurring in the original requirements.
Whenever AUTOCERT has carried out some analysis
using the prover (e.g., that a code fragment establishes some
property), the document provides links to the corresponding
VCs. A semantic labeling of the VCs [3] allows us to
associate only the small number of VCs with the code
fragment that actually contribute to demonstrating how a
given requirement holds for the fragment. This provides a
“natural” high-level grouping mechanism for the VCs, which
helps reviewers to focus their attention on the artifacts and
locations that are relevant for each requirement.
Explaining Inferred Operations and Conventions. As
a result of its analysis, AUTOCERT effectively “reverse
engineers” the code, and, based on the information speciﬁed
in the schemas, identiﬁes both the high-level mathematical
structures that are used by the operations relevant to the
current requirement, e.g., DCMs and quaternions, and the
lower-level data structures used to represent these, e.g.,
matrices and vectors, including any underlying conventions
that manifest themselves in the lower-level data structures
(e.g., quaternion handedness). This analysis also identiﬁes
cases where several lower-level data structures are used
to represent a high-level concept, such as three 3-vectors
representing a DCM.
The report contains a concise summary of this informa-
tion, going from the abstract mathematical structures to the
the concrete operations; see Figure 5 for an example. In
each category, the entries are grouped by sub-categories, so
that for example all extracted information concerning the
representation of DCMs is together. This sub-categorization
is derived from an underlying concept ontology and the
concept lists of the applied schemas. It highlights poten-
Figure 5. Operations and conventions
Figure 6. Correctness justiﬁcation
tial problems caused by different representations used in
different parts of the model or by different operations
(e.g., the representation of DCMs as 9-vectors and three
3-vectors), and directs the reviewers’ attention to this for
further inspection and clariﬁcation.
Explaining Correctness. The backbone of the document is
a chain of implications from the properties of one variable
to the properties of one or more dependent variables, cor-
responding to the recovered code-to-code links. The chain
starts at those key variables which appear in the requirement,
and continues to variables in the assumptions or input
signals. Figure 6 shows one step in this chain.
At this step in the justiﬁcation, we need to show that
the variable T_NED_to_body1 is a DCM from NED to
the Body frame. First, we show that the information which
has been inferred at this point in the code does indeed give
the variable the required properties, themselves expressed
as a post-condition. Two VCs establish this (cf. “safety
of this use”). Second, the location where the variable is
deﬁned is given, and the correctness of that deﬁnition is
established, i.e., that it does deﬁne the relevant form of
DCM, which gives rise to three VCs. Third, we observethat this deﬁnition—a matrix multiplication—depends, in
turn, on properties of other variables, i.e., the multiplicands,
with which the explanation continues later in the document.
Fourth, we show that the properties of the deﬁnition are
sufﬁcient to imply the properties of the use, and that these
properties are preserved along the path connecting the two
locations; however, in this example, the path is straightfor-
ward and does not induce any further VCs.
Summarizing Proofs. Proofs found by ATPs are typically
very big, even for simple conjectures. It is thus necessary to
summarize the pertinent information, instead of verbalizing
the proofs themselves, as for example done in [5]. First,
we group axioms into theories and, in some cases, only list
the theory instead of the individual axioms. For example
all arithmetic reasoning is hidden under a single entry.
More relevant axioms representing frame reasoning are listed
individually. Since the axiom names are internal and convey
no meaning to a reviewer, we associate explanatory texts
with the categories. Second, we combine information from
entire VC sets, again using recovered traceability links to
identify conceptually related VCs.
V. CONCLUSION
Program comprehension and program veriﬁcation are
fundamentally related activities, because they both need
to understand concepts that are distributed throughout the
code. Early program comprehension techniques such as
plans [8] or focusing [9] are similar to weak forms of our
schemas. Techniques based on approximations to structural
and behavioral patterns have also been used by Antkiewicz
et al. [1] to reverse engineer framework-speciﬁc models from
framework code. Similarly to our work these techniques also
use patterns to reverse engineer “logical structure”, but they
do not verify the selected fragments. The Whyline tool [6],
which uses techniques from program analysis to answer user
queries about program behavior, is closer to our approach in
that veriﬁcation techniques are used to provide explanations
in terms of concepts from a domain. However, none of the
existing approaches can provide veriﬁed traceability links
between domain concepts, requirements, code fragments,
and veriﬁcation artifacts, or can construct a high-level natu-
ral language explanation for why the speciﬁed requirements
follow from the assumptions and a background domain
theory. AUTOCERT’s documentation feature is aimed at
facilitating code reviews for auto-generated code, thus in-
creasing trust in otherwise opaque code generators without
excessive manual V&V effort, and better enabling the use
of automated code generation in safety-critical contexts.
We are currently working to automate linking of inferred
concepts to a mission ontology database, which has been
mandated by NASA’s Constellation program. The idea is that
by automatically annotating the code with inferred concepts,
engineers are relieved of this documentation chore. We also
plan to provide links to mission requirements documents and
other relevant project documentation. Further scaling will
require better hierarchy and abstraction mechanisms, and
more top-level summaries. Listing formulas and equations
that are used in the code would also be helpful for reviews,
since ultimately these need to be scrutinized by domain
experts. More ambitiously, we seek to further raise the
level of abstraction at which the code is explained to the
algorithmic level. The ideas of Koellman and Goedicke [7]
on recognizing algorithms might prove useful there.
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